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The drive for corporate democracy. 
Giving Voice to 
Shareholder Choice 
by JAYNE W BARNARD 
IN NEW YORK, in order to get on the ballot as a c4ndidate for statewide office, one needs only to pq.y a nominal filing fee and gather up 20,000 
voter signatures, which is usually an easy task. Once 
that th~eshold is met, the cost of printing and distribut-
ing balIots is borne by the government. 
In th~t same state, unless selected by incumbent 
managers, the only way to be elected as a director of a 
publicly owned company is to launch a full-scale 
proxy contest. This involves printing and mailing 
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thousands of proxy disclosure documents and ballots 
(prepared by a securities specialist at the standard 
hourly rate) at one's own expense. 
Given these rules, it is no wonder that there is al-
most always a contest for even the most minor public 
office whereas elections for positions on corporate 
boards only rarely involve a proxy fight. In 1989, ac-
cording to the Investor Responsibility Research Cen-
ter, out of more than 15,000 public companies, there 
were only a dozen proxy contests for positions on cor-
porate boards. 
Many critics have been asking why it is so costly for 
a capable investor or other interested individual to 
seek election to a corporate board. Every publicly 
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held corporation must send out a proxy statement 
each year in advance of the annual shareholder meet-
ing. Since the proxy statements always list the candi-
dates nominated by incumbent management, why not 
require these companies also to include candidates 
independently nominated by non management share-
holders? Eligibility to make nominations could be lim-
ited to those who own (or could compile the support 
of others who collectively own) a substantial amount 
of stock, say $500,000, or enough to represent some 
percentage of the total, say 3 percent. Other safe-
guards could be imposed to ensure that gadflies, 
"flakes:' and takeover artists do not take advantage of 
this simple, though valuable, nomination privilege. 
"Shareholder access to the proxy has been 
an issue since the federal securities laws 
were enacted:' 
Noted academics like Louis Lowenstein of Colum-
bia Law School and Melvin Eisenberg of the Univer-
sity of California have advanced proposals to provide 
shareholders access to the proxy statement to permit 
them to nominate directorial candidates. Savvy practi-
tioners like Martin Lipton have argued that direct ac-
cess to the proxy would correct the existing 
imbalance of power between incumbent manage-
ment and outside investors and might even curb the 
takeover binge. Ralph Nader has endorsed share-
holder access to the proxy. Congressmen and senators 
on both the left and the right have submitted bills that 
would provide shareholder access. To date these bills 
have been defeated. 
As it stands now, the typical shareholder receives a 
ballot each year containing a single slate of nominees 
hand-selected by incumbent management. For exam-
ple, ten candidates would be nominated for ten board 
positions. There are no other choices and, because 
proxies have been submitted to management and tal-
lied in advance, the process of nominating from the 
floor at the annual meeting is invariably futile. Thus, 
as one observer has noted, the typical Third World 
dictatorship often enjoys more "democracy" than do 
American shareholders. 
AGITATING FOR ACTION 
Now a new group of activists has come along seek-
ing a greater voice in the selection of those men and 
women who run America's big corporations. Some, 
like oil industry analyst Kurt Wulff, have attempted to 
gain access to the proxy one corporation at a time. 
Others, like T. Boone Pickens and his United Share-
holders Association, have been seeking a legislative 
solution to the access problem. Big institutional inves-
tors, notably the California Public Employee Retire-
ment System (CaIPERS), have been agitating for any 
effective means by which major shareholders can 
have a voice in directorial selection and long-range 
corporate planning. The SEC, which considered 
adopting access rules in the past, before abandoning 
the effort during the Reagan administration, has re-
mained silent on the growing access debate. 
Corporate managers dismiss access efforts, arguing 
that there is ample opportunity for serious sharehold-
ers to playa role in choosing board members. Invita-
tions to "write to our nominating committees" are 
often included in the annual proxy statement. Share-
holders are asked to "give us your ideas for an im-
proved board of directors, and we will carefully 
consider them:' However, in a survey of 300 public 
companies conducted by The Conference Board, the 
futility of making suggestions to board nominating 
committees became apparent. 
SURVEY SAYS 
Nominating committee respondents were asked 
where they first learned of their ultimate board nomi-
nees. Fully nine out of ten identified the chief execu-
tive officer as the prime source of nominees. 
Shareholders, on the other hand, significantly influ-
enced the nomination of candidates in only a handful 
of companies. Indeed, more than eight out of ten sur-
vey respondents did not find shareholders to be a use-
ful source or even a source at all in the search for 
board candidate nominees. 
"The SEC has remained silent on the growing 
access debate:' 
Recently, more and more corporations have created 
board nominating committees, often made up exclu-
sively of outside directors. A recent survey suggests 
that as many as 70 percent of the Standard & Poor's 
500 companies now have some form of nominating 
committee. But that development has been accompa-
nied by an increasing resistance to shareholder nomi-
nations. Many companies have adopted stringent 
bylaws or operating procedures to dictate the form 
that shareholder nominations must conform to for 
consideration by the board. Many require a full biog-
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raphy and financial information such as eventually 
would be required by the SEC if the nomination were 
submitted to the shareholders. Some even require a 
signed consent by the candidate before a sharehold-
er's suggestion will even be presented to the nominat-
ing committee. 
Shareholders - particularly holders of large blocks 
of stock - argue that the will of dissatisfied investors 
should not be frustrated by these nominating commit-
tee "gatekeepers" appointed by management. 
"The typical Third World dictatorship often 
enjoys more democracy than do 
shareholders of American corporations:' 
Shareholders are guaranteed by law the right to 
elect corporate directors; that should include the right 
to nominate directorial candidates as well. In practice 
and tradition, however, the right to nominate exists 
only for those who are present at the annual meeting 
or those willing to undertake their own independent 
proxy solicitation. The right to nominate does not in-
clude those unwilling to bear the cost of a separate 
mailing but merely hope to be free riders on the cor-
porate proxy statement. 
In the political world, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
ruled that the right to vote must include an effective 
voice in the nomination process. Thus, black voters 
excluded from participating in all-white Democratic 
Party primaries were found to have been denied their 
constitutional rights and the exclusionary primary sys-
tem was dismantled. Alas, there are no constitutional 
rights on which shareholders may rely. Thus, share-
holder activists have turned to Congress to give them 
a real voice in the selection of corporate boards. 
The Senate has before it the Corporate Takeover Re-
form Act, a bipartisan bill that provides for any share-
holder or group of shareholders representing at least 3 
percent of a company's voting shares to nominate 
directorial candidates. Biographical information 
would be included in the management proxy, where 
they are given "equal space, coverage, and treat-
ment;' as are management's candidates. 
PROXY MOXIE 
The need for this reform was highlighted last year 
when the Delaware Supreme Court protected Time, 
Inc:s decision to merge with Warner Communications 
notwithstanding the overwhelming desire of share-
holders instead to sell their shares to Paramount, Inc., 
at a substantial premium. The court's ruling was based 
on the express proposition that "corporation law does 
not [require] directors ... to follow the wishes of a 
majority of shares:' 
Assume a majority of Time's shareholders now wish 
to express their dissatisfaction with the Warner trans-
action in the only way left to them: by replacing the 
incumbent board (or at least some of its members). In 
the absence of an access provision, their only means 
of doing so would be through the prohibitively expen-
sive mechanism of a proxy fight that as a practical 
matter is only likely to be pursued by a raider seeking 
a change in management for his own profit. Access to 
the proxy would permit an alternative means of ex-
pression, at a minimal cost to shareholders as a group. 
What would be the long-term impact of the Senate's 
access proposal? Some corporate executives fear it 
would encourage corporate raiders or result in a 
board unable to make effective decisions and trans-
fixed by short-term considerations. Others concede it 
would be sparingly used and seldom effective in actu-
ally replacing a board member because of the high 
costs of follow-up solicitation necessary, even where 
the ballots would be circulated at corporate expense. 
They acknowledge, though, that the mere existence of 
access rights would stimulate more interchange be-
tween management and institutional investors who 
now own over 50 percent and sometimes as much as 
90 percent of the stock in many major corporations in 
this country. 
"The futility of making suggestions to 
nominating committees became apparent:' 
Shareholder access to the proxy has been an issue 
since the federal securities laws were enacted in the 
1930s. Its vitality has risen and fallen with political 
and economic tides. Whereas most corporate man-
agers today, as they did in 1934, reject the notion that 
shareholders have any contribution to make to the 
process of corporate governance, their most sophisti-
cated investors feel otherwise. Some investment man-
agers now control portfolios ranging into the billions 
of dollars, and are increasingly insisting that their 
views be heard. 
As the composition of shareholder ownership in 
public companies changes from large numbers of in-
dividual investors with small holdings to a much 
smaller concentration of institutional investors with 
large holdings, access to the proxy will be increas-
ingly an issue to watch. D 
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